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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 940448-CA 
V. : 
Priority No. 10 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn 
W. Davis, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issue is presented on appeal: 
Did the trial court correctly determine that 
defendant's otherwise valid consent was attenuated from what the 
trial court characterized as a prior "technical" violation of 
law, despite the fact that there was no temporal break or other 
intervening circumstance between the improper police conduct and 
defendant's consent to search? 
A trial court's determination of whether a consent to 
search obtained after police misconduct is sufficiently 
attenuated from that illegal conduct to be deemed valid is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-1272 (Utah 1993). A trial court's 
findings of fact that underlie its attenuation determination will 
not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules for a determination of this case are as follows: 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and his co-defendant, Michael McNaughton1, 
were charged with possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 1). Both 
defendants filed motions to suppress, which were denied by the 
trial court following an evidentiary hearing (R. 88-92, 96-99). 
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order, and this Court granted defendant's petition 
(R. 103-04) . 
On appeal, the State conceded that the arresting 
officer had exceeded the scope of detention permitted for a 
traffic stop by asking defendant whether he had any weapons or 
1
 Mr. McNaughton has not joined defendant in this 
interlocutory appeal. Br. of Appellant at 3. 
2 
contraband in his car because the facts known to the officer did 
not support a finding of reasonable suspicion of drug 
trafficking. The State argued, however, that the officer's 
improper question was only a technical violation and that 
defendant's subsequent consent to search the vehicle was 
therefore not tainted by the prior police illegality. This Court 
accepted the State's concession of error on the scope of 
detention issue and remanded the case for further proceedings on 
the issue of attenuation (R. 220-21). 
On remand, defendant renewed his motion to suppress 
before Judge Lynn W. Davis2, and the parties briefed the issue 
of attenuation to the trial court. After an evidentiary hearing 
and oral arguments, the trial court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as well as an order denying defendant's motion 
to suppress (R. 293-303, 340). Defendant filed a petition for 
permission to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order, and 
the State recommended that the petition be granted (R. 312-14). 
This Court granted defendant's petition (R. 311). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the hearing on defendant's original motion to 
suppress, the arresting officer, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Lance Bushnell, was the only witness called to testify. 
Following the hearing, Judge Ballif entered a signed memorandum 
decision, and later, he entered additional findings of fact and 
2
 Judge Ballif heard defendant's original motion to 
suppress. The case was reassigned to Judge Davis because of 
Judge Ballifs retirement. 
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conclusions of law (R. 88-92, 96-99). (Copies of Judge Ballif's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as his memorandum 
decision are attached hereto as addendum B.) 
The facts adduced at the suppression hearing are 
recited below in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling. See State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994) 
(When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 
appellate courts recite the facts in the light most favorable to 
that ruling.). 
On July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, a four year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol who was certified at 
estimating the speeds of motor vehicles, observed a car traveling 
in the opposite direction on 1-15 near Nephi (R. 147-150). 
Bushnell estimated that the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 
approximately seventy-five miles per hour, ten miles per hour in 
excess of the posted speed limit (R. 150). 
Because the radar gun he was using did not have the 
capacity to determine the speed of cars going the opposite 
direction across the median, Bushnell decided to cross the median 
and pace the vehicle from behind. Although he allowed the 
vehicle to drive further down the road before he crossed the 
freeway, defendant -- who was driving the car -- apparently saw 
Bushnell cross the median because when Bushnell caught up to the 
car it had slowed down to sixty miles per hour -- five miles per 
hour under the posted speed limit (R. 150-51, 167-69) . 
Bushnell was not able to verify defendant's speed 
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either by pacing or with a radar gun (R. 169) . He therefore 
decided to simply warn defendant to slow down (R. 152, 162-65). 
Bushnell's decision was in keeping with his policy of issuing 
warnings instead of speeding citations in cases in which he is 
unable to verify his visual estimate of a vehicle's speed (R. 
166). In the instant case, Bushnell decided to give defendant a 
hand signal to keep his speed down (R. 151-52, 171). Bushnell 
pulled along side the vehicle, but neither defendant nor his 
passenger would look at Bushnell- Unable to convey a hand 
signal, Bushnell fell back behind the vehicle and then pulled 
along side the car one more time to try and attract the attention 
of defendant or his passenger (R. 152, 171). Again, neither of 
them would look toward the trooper (R. 171). 
After making two unsuccessful attempts to issue 
defendant an informal warning to slow down via a hand signal, 
Bushnell stopped the vehicle to issue a warning citation (R. 
152). Upon stopping the vehicle, the trooper approached 
defendant and asked for a driver's license and registration. 
Defendant produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce 
vehicle registration. Defendant indicated that he had borrowed 
the car from a friend from Minnesota3 named "Bill," but he could 
provide no other information about the car's owner (R. 152-53). 
As he searched for the registration form, defendant 
appeared extremely nervous. He was moving very quickly and his 
hands were trembling. Defendant eventually found an insurance 
3
 The car carried Minnesota license plates (R. 152). 
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information form with the name "William Kayler" upon it, which he 
gave to the trooper (R. 152-55). 
Bushnell began to suspect that the car was stolen 
because of defendant's inability to produce a proper vehicle 
registration form as well as his inability to provide a full name 
of the vehicle's owner or any other information about the owner. 
Defendant's nervous behavior, which Bushnell indicated was much 
greater than that typically exhibited by other drivers stopped 
for traffic violations, served to reinforce Bushnell's suspicion 
that something was awry (R. 153, 172-72). Under these 
circumstances, Bushnell decided to request an N.C.I.C. check on 
the vehicle to see if it had been reported stolen (R. 179). 
The report came back negative and indicated that the 
vehicle was owned by a person named "William Kayler," the same 
name that appeared on the insurance form that defendant found in 
the vehicle (R. 178). However, Bushnell testified that stolen 
vehicles are not always promptly listed as having been reported 
stolen. Indeed, although he did not know how long it typically 
took officials in Minnesota to post a stolen vehicle report, 
Bushnell testified that in California it takes two days for such 
a report to be filed (R. 178-80). Moreover, Bushnell had 
personally recovered stolen cars on other occasions -- even 
though N.C.I.C. checks had failed to indicate that the vehicle 
had been reported stolen (R. 205).4 
4
 The record is less than clear on the question of exactly 
when Bushnell ran the N.C.I.C. check and whether he had received 
(continued...) 
6 
Bushnell returned to the vehicle and asked defendant 
where they had been and where they were going. Defendant 
answered that they had been to California and were going back 
home to Minnesota (R. 153-54). Bushnell then asked if there were 
any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. Defendant said that he 
had no knowledge about anything of that sort being in the vehicle 
(R. 154). Bushnell followed up his question by asking " [d] o you 
mind if we5 look?" The trial court found that defendant 
"unhesitatingly replied[,] 'help yourself'" (R. 98), and 
defendant got out of the car (R. 155). 
Bushnell then asked the passenger, co-defendant 
McNaughton, to get out of the vehicle. McNaughton got out and 
stood behind the car with defendant, out of the lane of traffic 
(R. 155). 
As McNaughton exited the vehicle, Bushnell asked him 
his name. McNaughton "just grabbed his wallet and started 
digging through his wallet" (R. 155). McNaughton's hands were 
visibly shaking as he passed over his driver's license three 
4(...continued) 
the results before he asked defendant for consent to search the 
vehicle. Indeed, in its initial ruling the trial court indicated 
only that "[i]t is unclear from the facts whether the officer 
asked for consent to search the car while he was waiting for the 
results of NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was 
not listed as stolen when he asked for consent" (R. 90). 
Nevertheless, based on its subsequently entered findings of fact, 
it appears that the trial court determined that Bushnell knew the 
results of the check before he asked for consent to search (R. 
98). Because of the ambiguity in the record, it cannot be said 
that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. 
5
 By "we" Trooper Bushnell was referring to himself and 
Deputy Bill Thompkins, who was riding with Bushnell (R. 155). 
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separate times. Bushnell finally stopped McNaughton and said, 
"[i]sn't that [your driver's license] right there?" (R. 156). 
McNaughton quickly reached for his license and tried to remove it 
from his wallet. However, because he was moving so quickly and 
shaking so badly, McNaughton spilled all the contents of his 
wallet onto the ground. Bushnell asked McNaughton why he was so 
nervous, and McNaughton replied that he did not come in contact 
with the police very often (R. 156). Bushnell testified that 
McNaughton's extreme nervousness served to further reinforce his 
suspicion that the two men had stolen the vehicle (R. 182). 
As Bushnell began to search the vehicle, he found a 
package of "Zig Zag" rolling papers inside a Nike court shoe in 
the back seat (R. 156-57). Bushnell stated that such papers are 
typically used to roll marijuana cigarettes, but that they can 
also be used for rolling tobacco. However, the trooper found 
neither tobacco nor marijuana in the vehicle (R. 188-89). 
Bushnell asked both men if they owned the papers, but neither of 
the two claimed ownership (R. 157). 
The trooper could not understand why neither would 
admit to owning the rolling papers because it is not illegal to 
possess such papers (R. 157, 190). The denial of ownership, 
coupled with the driver's inability to produce a vehicle 
registration form or to identify the owner of the vehicle beyond 
stating that his name was "Bill," as well as the extreme 
nervousness of both defendant and his companion, caused Bushnell 
to suspect not only that the vehicle was stolen, but also that 
8 
the two might be transporting illegal narcotics. According to 
Bushnell, the latter suspicion was also based in part on his 
having previously encountered --in about 3 0 percent of his 
prior felony narcotics arrests -- drug traffickers who were 
traveling in a vehicle that was either stolen or had been loaned 
to them by a third party (R. 177, 193-95). 
Bushnell then searched the trunk of the vehicle, but he 
found nothing of consequence. He also asked defendant if he 
could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and defendant 
said "[g]o ahead" (R. 157). Again, the trooper found no 
contraband (R. 157). 
Bushnell then searched under the hood of the car. 
There he saw an oil cloth wedged between the battery and interior 
wall of the right front fender. Bushnell felt the cloth and 
could tell that it contained something that felt like a brick of 
narcotics similar to those he had seized on other occasions (R. 
157-60, 192-93). Further inspection revealed that the cloth 
covered a brown grocery bag that contained a kilogram of cocaine 
(R. 160-61). 
Defendant and McNaughton were then arrested and charged 
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (R. 159). 
After defendant successively appealed the denial of his 
first motion to suppress, the case was remanded for further 
proceedings on the issue of whether defendant's consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from Bushnell's improper questions about 
narcotics trafficking (R. 220-21). (A copy of this Court's 
9 
opinion in which it remanded defendant's case for consideration 
of the State's attenuation argument is attached hereto as 
addendum C.) Judge Davis held a supplemental evidentiary hearing 
on defendant's renewed motion to suppress and entered findings of 
fact based on the testimony adduced at that hearing (R. 293-303, 
348). (A copy of Judge Davis' ruling as well as the order 
denying defendant's motion to suppress is attached hereto as 
addendum A.) Those findings are reproduced below verbatim: 
1. Officer Lance Bushnell stated that as of 
the date of the stop [of defendant's 
vehicle], July 20, 1991, there was no written 
or verbal policy of his department, the Utah 
Highway [P]atrol, proscribing an inquiry of a 
driver of a vehicle whether there were any 
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. 
2. Officer Bushnell testified that 
department policy allowed him to ask personal 
questions at a stop; the questions are not 
scripted. 
3. Officer Bushnell testified that it was 
his practice to routinely ask whether there 
was any contraband in stopped vehicles. 
Ziegleman and McNaughton were not singled out 
for any reason. 
4. Officer Bushnell further testified that 
his law enforcement practices are guided by 
P.O.S.T. training, by legal advice from the 
county attorney, from reading court 
decisions, and from departmental directive. 
5. Officer Bushnell testified that at the 
time of the stop, he was not aware of any 
law, statute, or court case which would have 
prohibited, or called into question, his 
inquiry regarding contraband and a request to 
search. 
6. He further testified that he, therefore, 
proceeded under the law at the time and that 
his procedure and behavior were proper and 
that he acted in conformity with the legal 
10 
advi[ce] he had been given. 
7. Lastly, he testified that he has now 
abandoned this procedure in light of new case 
law decisions handed down since this stop and 
upon the advice of counsel. 
R. 295-296. 
The trial court then reviewed the case law as it 
existed at the time Bushnell stopped defendant's vehicle. It 
concluded that there was "no Utah court ruling on the issue of 
whether the officer's questions [about weapons and contraband] 
was in violation of the defendant's rights" and that "Bushnell's 
conduct was arguably permissible" under case law from the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals (R. 299). Finally, the trial court 
stressed that Bushnell had abandoned his practice of routinely 
asking whether there were narcotics or weapons in a stopped 
vehicle as a result of this Court's opinion in State v. Godina-
Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) (R. 301). The trial court 
noted, however, that "[n]o one would suggest that law enforcement 
officers should be clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate 
decisions" (R. 301). 
In light of its findings of fact, the trial court 
characterized Bushnell's improper questioning as only a 
"technical violation" because Bushnell's error "d[id] not rise to 
the level of willful or even negligent misconduct" (R. 3 02). The 
trial court then concluded that the deterrent purpose underlying 
the Thurman attenuation doctrine was not implicated in cases 
involving mere technical violations and that "the absence of a 
temporal break or other intervening circumstances between the 
11 
asking of the improper questions and defendant's consent to 
search [was therefore] inconsequential" (R. 3 00-3 01). 
Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress on the grounds that defendant's consent was not obtained 
by police exploitation of a prior illegality (R. 302). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although Bushnell exceeded the scope of detention 
permitted for a routine traffic stop when he asked defendant 
whether there were any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle, that 
misconduct was only a technical violation because Bushnell's 
questioning was permissible under then existing case law. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently made clear in State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the policy objective 
underlying the attenuation analysis is deterrence of police 
misconduct. Because Bushnell's conduct was in keeping with then 
existing case law as it was explained to him by the local county 
attorney and at police training seminars, Bushnell's action 
cannot be deemed a flagrant act of misconduct or even negligent 
misconduct. Rather, as the trial court determined, Bushnell 
committed only a "technical violation" that became apparent 
because of case law handed down after the stop of defendant's 
vehicle. He has since changed his conduct in an effort to comply 
with that new case law. The deterrent rationale underpinning 
Thurman's attenuation analysis is not implicated under such 
circumstances. This Court should therefore uphold the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the ground 
12 
that defendant's consent to search was valid because it was not 
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALTHOUGH TROOPER BUSHNELL LACKED REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, AND 
THEREFORE EXCEEDED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF 
DETENTION BY ASKING WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD ANY 
WEAPONS OR CONTRABAND IN HIS VEHICLE, 
SUPPRESSION IS NOT WARRANTED IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH THE 
VEHICLE IS VALID UNDER THURMAN. 
Although the State conceded on defendant's 1993 appeal, 
and this Court agreed, that the facts known to Bushnell at the 
time he asked defendant whether he was carrying any weapons or 
narcotics did not support a reasonable suspicion of such 
activity, suppression of the evidence discovered in the 
consensual search of the vehicle driven by defendant is not 
warranted. Rather, because the search of the vehicle can be 
sanctioned under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), 
as clarified in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 
1993), there is "no legitimate justification for depriving the 
prosecution of reliable and probative evidence." Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (J. Powell, concurring). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
A. The Validity Of Defendant's Consent Under The 
Voluntariness Prong of Thurman. 
Under Thurman, the inquiry into whether a consent to 
search is lawfully obtained following illegal police action must 
13 
focus on two factors: (1) whether the consent was voluntary, and 
(2) whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of 
the prior illegality. In this case, Trooper Bushnell's 
uncontroverted testimony established, and the trial court found, 
that defendant "unhesitatingly" consented to the search of his 
vehicle (R. 98). The trial court deemed defendant's consent 
voluntary because there was no evidence of duress or coercion (R. 
99). Defendant has not challenged the trial court's finding of 
voluntary consent on appeal, and there is ample case law to 
support its ruling. See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 
918-919 (Utah App. 1992) (officer's uncontroverted testimony 
demonstrated defendant voluntarily consented to search of his 
vehicle). The first prong of Thurman, therefore, is not at 
issue. There remains, however, the question of whether 
defendant's consent was sufficiently attenuated from the prior 
illegality. As demonstrated below, suppression is not warranted 
because it cannot be said that Bushnell "exploited" the prior 
illegality in order to obtain defendant's consent. 
B. Arroyo's Attenuation/Exploitation Prong As 
Clarified In Thurman. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the analysis 
to be conducted under the exploitation (or attenuation) prong of 
Arrovo. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 1993). 
Significantly, the Court began its discussion of the exploitation 
prong with an unequivocal statement of the policy consideration 
that underlies Arrovo: 
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police 
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from engaging in illegal conduct even though 
that conduct may be followed by a voluntary 
consent to the subsequent search. 
The deterrence rationale discussed in 
Arroyo is grounded in the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). There, 
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion 
joined by now Chief Justice Rehnguist, made 
it clear that the analysis used to invalidate 
consent on the basis of exploitation was 
grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes of 
the exclusionary rule. Id. at 608-12. 
Justice Powell's admonition that the 
exploitation analysis "always should be 
conducted with the deterrent purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule sharply in 
focus," id. at 612, has become a cornerstone 
of search and seizure jurisprudence. See 4 
Search & Seizure § 11.4(a), at 373: see also 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and 
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
378, 390 (1964) [hereinafter Amsterdam]. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263. 
Having identified the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule as the underpinning of the Arroyo exploitation 
prong, the Thurman Court reiterated the factors to be considered 
by courts: "[!)] 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct,' [2)] the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and 
the consent, and [3)] 'the presence of intervening 
circumstances.'" Id. at 1263 (citations omitted). The Thurman 
Court then discussed each factor in greater detail, emphasizing 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule throughout its 
discussion. 
Clearly, the "purpose and flagrancy" factor is the most 
significant of the three because it is "directly related to the 
deterrent value of suppression." Id. at 1263 (citations 
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omitted). As such, the first task a court should complete under 
the exploitation prong is to characterize the nature and degree 
of the prior illegality based on a continuum of "flagrancy" and 
"egregiousness." Id. See also State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) (post-
Thurman case in which this Court began its attenuation analysis 
by evaluating police misconduct on scale of purposefulness and 
flagrancy). 
To put the Thurman continuum into perspective, it must 
first be recognized that n/[t]he deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have 
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which 
[sic] has deprived the defendant of some right.'" Id. (quoting 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring) in turn quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Further, "[t]he 
nature and degree of the illegality will usually be inversely 
related to the effectiveness of time and intervening events to 
dissipate the presumed taint. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. 
Thus, at one end of the continuum is police misconduct 
that is "flagrantly abusive, [such that] there is a greater 
likelihood that the police engaged in the conduct as a pretext 
for collateral objectives," or instances in which "the purpose of 
the misconduct was to achieve the consent[.]" Id. (citations 
omitted). In such cases, court "will require a clean break in 
the chain of events between the misconduct and the consent to 
find the consent valid." Id. In the absence of such a clean 
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break, "suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater 
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future." Id. 
(footnote and citation omitted). 
Next in line to purposeful or flagrant misconduct on 
the Thurman continuum is negligent police misconduct. Although 
"less critical to the dissipation of the taint," time and 
intervening circumstances are still significant "where it appears 
that the illegality arose as the result of negligence[.]" Id. at 
1264. 
At the other extreme of purposeful and flagrant 
misconduct are instances where "the police had no 'purpose' in 
engaging in the misconduct[.] [F]or example, if the illegality 
arose because [a court] later invalidated a statute on which the 
police had relied in good faith--suppression would have no 
deterrent value." Id. (citations omitted). In Brown, Justice 
Powell characterized this type of conduct as a "technical" 
constitutional violation. 422 U.S. at 611-12 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). In such instances, time and 
other intervening events are inconsequential because, regardless 
of such considerations, suppression is not warranted. That is 
because the "underlying premise [of the exclusionary rule], is 
lacking, [and] the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule 
does not obtain[.]" Id. at 612. Accordingly, absent at least 
negligent police conduct, evidence should not be excluded because 
there is "no legitimate justification for depriving the 
prosecution of reliable and probative evidence." Id. 
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Relying on the State's interpretation of Thurman's 
attenuation analysis as articulated above (R. 298), the trial 
court determined that Bushnell committed only a "technical 
violation" of the law and that defendant's otherwise valid 
consent was not the product of police exploitation of a prior 
illegality (R. 300-302) . Accordingly, the trial court held that 
suppression of the evidence obtained during a consensual search 
of defendant's vehicle was not warranted because no deterrent 
purpose would be advanced under the facts presented. As 
demonstrated below, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Held That 
The Illegality That Occurred In 
This Case Constituted Only A 
Technical Violation Of Law. 
Recognizing that the policy underlying Arroyo is the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule, the trial court held 
that suppression would be inappropriate in this case because, 
even though Bushnell exceeded the permissible scope of detention, 
his actions did not constitute flagrant misconduct or a 
purposeful violation of the law (R. 3 02)• Indeed, because 
Bushnell's questioning was arguably proper under the law in 
effect at the time of the stop, the trial court determined that 
Bushnell's conduct did not even rise to the level of negligence 
(id.). On that basis, the trial court properly characterized the 
trooper's mistake as a "technical" violation that did not warrant 
suppression of reliable and probative evidence (id.). 
In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992), 
this Court made clear that an officer, as part of a routine 
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traffic stop, may not legally ask the question regarding 
narcotics and weapons that Bushnell asked in this case. However, 
at the time that Bushnell stopped defendant, Utah courts had not 
resolved that issue. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, had issued several panel decisions indicating that an 
officer could ask such question during the course of even routine 
traffic stops. 
In United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 976 (10th 
Cir. 1989), and United States v. Diaz-Albertini, 772 F.2d 654, 
659 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 822 (1987), the 
panels held that such questions, even though unsupported by 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, were permissible 
during a routine traffic stop. Similarly, in United States v. 
Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 814-16 (10th Cir. 1991), the panel 
explained that an extended detention of the defendant to ask such 
questions, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, violated the fourth amendment. See also United States 
v. Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). However, the Walker 
panel dropped the following footnote in its opinion: 
Under the reasoning of United States v. 
Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 
1990), our determination that defendant was 
unlawfully detained might be different if the 
questioning by the officer did not delay the 
stop beyond the measure of time necessary to 
issue a citation. For example, this case 
would be significantly changed if the officer 
asked the same questions while awaiting the 
results of an NCIC license of registration 
inquiry. 
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933 F.2d at 816 n.2. Accordingly, under then existing case law 
from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, questions such as the 
one posed by Bushnell were proper so long as the suspect was not 
detained any longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the 
stop. 
Bushnell was familiar with the rulings from the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals because he had been told about them in 
police training sessions and by the local county attorney (R. 
295). He attempted to act in conformity with those requirements, 
and, as the trial court found, Bushnell's conduct in this case 
did in fact conform to the training and legal advice he had 
received (R. 301). Specifically, the trial court held that 
Bushnell could have detained defendant based on defendant's 
failure to produce proper vehicle registration and also to 
investigate his suspicion that the vehicle was stolen (R. 299-
3 00). Neither of these issues were contested by the defendant 
below, nor has he attacked the trial court's determinations on 
appeal. That decision is well measured because the trial court's 
ruling is amply supported by case law. See, e.g., State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (once a driver has 
produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be 
allowed to proceed, without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning). 
Because Bushnell's question did not extend the period 
of detention longer than was otherwise necessary, his conduct was 
proper under then existing case law from the tenth circuit --
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including Walker.6 It logically follows, and the trial court 
found, that Bushnell's "misconduct" in this case was properly 
characterized as only a "technical violation" on the Thurman 
continuum of flagrancy and purposefulness (R. 302) . Indeed, once 
Bushnell learned that the question he asked defendant in this 
case was not considered a proper part of a routine traffic stop 
(a change prompted by this Court's opinion in Godina-Luna) he 
voluntarily changed his conduct to comply with the newly 
announced legal standard (R. 301). As the trial court found, no 
deterrent purpose would be served by suppressing the narcotics 
recovered from defendant's vehicle in light of the facts 
presented (R. 302). 
D. Given That Bushnell's "Misconduct" Was A 
Here Technical Violation Resulting From 
A Change In Case Law, The Remaining 
Thurman Factors of Temporal Proximity 
and Intervening Circumstances Are 
Inconsequential. 
With respect to the temporal proximity and other 
intervening circumstances elements of the Thurman attenuation 
prong, the State conceded below that there was no break in time 
or other intervening circumstance between Bushnell's improper 
question and defendant's consent to search (R. 239, 242). 
However, as the trial court recognized, "the absence of a 
6
 Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here, 
Utah Courts have recognized that the "running of a warrants check 
in the course of a traffic stop is permissible, so long as it 
does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the 
stop." State v. Figueroa-Solorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 
1992). Accord State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1245 n.2 (Utah 
1994). 
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temporal break or other intervening circumstance between 
[Bushnell's] asking of the improper question and defendant's 
consent to search is inconsequential" because the police 
illegality was only a technical violation (R. 300-301 (citing 
Brown, 422 U.S. at 611-12)). 
Under Thurman and Brown, where the police illegality is 
merely a technical violation that does not even rise to the level 
of negligence, the deterrence rational of the exclusionary rule 
is not implicated. See generally. Brown, 422 U.S. at 611-12. 
The trial court recognized that fact and held that "this case is 
akin to one in which 'the illegality arose because [a court] 
later invalidated a statute on which the police had relied in 
good faith[;] suppression would [therefore] have no deterrent 
value'" (R. 300) (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 (citation 
omitted)). Because the trial court's ruling on this issue is 
consistent with Thurman and Brown, its ultimate determination 
that defendant's consent was not the product of police 
exploitation of prior police misconduct should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND 
PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
This case centers around the interpretation of the Utah 
Supreme Court's opinion in Thurman. Under Thurman. the State 
believes no break in time or other intervening circumstances 
between illegal police conduct and a defendant's consent to 
search is necessary to find attenuation in cases where the 
illegal conduct was a mere technicality not even rising to the 
level of negligence. In contrast, defendant argues that under 
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Thurman the lack of a break in time or intervening circumstance 
automatically renders any consent invalid. Each party's position 
implicates important policy considerations. The State believes 
that many of these policy considerations, as well as the 
viability of each party's proposed interpretation of Thurman, can 
best be tested by pressing questions from this Court. The State 
therefore requests oral argument. 
The State further requests that this case be decided in 
a fully reasoned published opinion. Trial courts continue to 
struggle with the attenuation doctrine, and only a few cases 
involving the attenuation doctrine have been decided since 
Thurman was handed down. Indeed, Utah's appellate courts have 
never reviewed a finding of attenuation in a case where the prior 
police illegality was deemed a mere technical violation of law. 
Accordingly, in the relatively undeveloped area of attenuation 
case law, this case presents a matter of first impression in 
Utah. This Court's decision should therefore be published in 
order to provide necessary guidance to trial courts on this 
evolving and important area of search and seizure law. 
CONCLUSION 
Trooper Bushnell's conduct was proper under the case 
law in place at the time he stopped defendant's vehicle. In 
recognition of that fact, the trial court properly determined 
that Bushnell's misconduct was only a technical violation that 
did not warrant suppression of reliable and probative evidence in 
the face of defendant's voluntarily given consent to search. In 
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keeping with the principles espoused in Thurman, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^Deputy 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
BRENT LEE ZIEGELMAN 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion Suppress 
CASE NO. 82E 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
Judge George E. Ballif, now retired, denied defendant's motion to suppress in a 
ruling dated January 14, 1992. That ruling was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. In a 
Memorandum Decision dated September 9,1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
decision of the trial court based upon several concessions by the State of Utah. The Court of 
Appeals remanded the case for determination as to whether the consent to search was valid 
under Thurman. The Remittitur was filed with the Clerk of the District Court on October 18, 
1993. 
On November 29, 1993, a conference call was conducted by the court. The 
purpose was for the court to determine if the parties wished a further evidentiary hearing or 
whether they wished the court to make the Thurman analysis from the record of the 
suppression hearing conducted on November 15, 1991, before Judge Ballif. The parties did 
not want to foreclose any options, so the court requested briefing and scheduled a hearing 
date to take evidence and to entertain legal argument. Counsel for defendant filed a 
"Request for Further Evidentiary Hearing and Demand for Speedy Trial" on November 19, 
1993. 
A hearing was scheduled on January 28, 1994. The State of Utah submitted 
extensive briefing on January 3, 1994. Defendant relied upon his original Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of the Motion to Suppress Evidence which was filed on 
$p& 
October 15, 1991. 
Subsequent to the hearing, defendant filed a Supplementary Memorandum on March 
31, 1994. The State then filed "State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum" about April 4, 1994. During the pendency of this case, counsel have alerted 
the court of the status of various cases now pending before Utah's appellate courts. The 
court, having entertained the arguments of counsel, reviewed the various memoranda, and 




The sole issue before the court is whether the consent to search in this traffic stop 
was valid under a Thurman analysis. Because Judge Ballif found no prior illegality, he did 
not address the validity of defendant's consent under the second prong of the Arroyo -
Thurman test. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded this case for the sole purpose of 
having this court evaluate: 
"Whether the consent was obtained by police expectation of the prior illegality...or, 
in other words, whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment valuation was 
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence." State v. Ziegleman. 
unpublished memorandum decision dated September 9, 1993, at 2 
This court wonders why the Utah Court of Appeals remanded this case. 
Admittedly, the questions of whether a defendant's consent was given voluntarily and 
whether this consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality, are factual 
questions. But certainly there appears in the record sufficient findings before the court in 
order to apply the Thurman analysis without the necessity of remand. Defendant argues that 
the Court of Appeals remanded the case in order for the trial court to dismiss the case. That 
position is not well taken. The Utah Court of Appeals could have suppressed the evidence 
and/or dismissed the case, if it desired. Was it remanded in order to take additional evidence 
w 
on the consent issue and have the trial court make the Thurman analysis? The Thurman 
analysis is a legal analysis and the facts have already been established. The reason for the 
remand is somewhat confusing to this court. Nevertheless, the court scheduled a 
supplementary evidentiary hearing. This court has no intention of disturbing the facts as 
previously determined by Judge George Ballif at the suppression hearing conducted by him. 
n 
Facts 
The facts as established by Judge Ballif at the suppression hearing are not in dispute 
as to the consent issue. This court conducted the supplementary hearing. 
This court, therefore, specifically adopts the Findings of Fact of Judge Ballif dated 
March 24, 1992, consisting of paragraphs 1-8. In addition, this court specifically finds the 
following from the supplemental evidentiary hearing: 
1. Officer Lance Bushnell stated that as of the date of the stop, July 20, 1991, 
there was no written or verbal policy of his department, the Utah Highway patrol, 
proscribing an inquiry of a driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or 
narcotics in the vehicle. 
2. Officer Bushnell testified that department policy allowed him to ask personal 
questions at a stop; the questions are not scripted. 
3. Officer Bushnell testified that it was his practice to routinely ask whether there 
was any contraband in stopped vehicles. Ziegleman and McNaughton were not singled out 
for any reason. 
4. Officer Bushnell further testified that his law enforcement practices are guided 
by P.O.S.T. training, by legal advice from the county attorney, from reading court decisions, 
and from departmental directive. 
5. Officer Bushnell testified that at the time of the stop, he was not aware of any 
law, statute, or court case which would have prohibited, or called into question, his inquiry 
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regarding contraband and a request to search. 
6. He further testified that he, therefore, proceeded under the law at the time and 
that his procedure and behavior were proper and that he acted in conformity with the legal 
advise he had been given. 
7. Lastly, he testified that he has now abandoned this procedure in light of new 
case law decisions handed down since this stop and upon advice of counsel. 
m 
Discussion 
For the most part, the State's analysis of State v. Arroyo , 796 P.2d 684 (1990), 
and State v. Thurman , 846 P.2d 1256 (1193), is accurate. Determining whether a 
defendant's consent to a search following illegal police action is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment, requires inquiry into (1) whether the consent was given voluntary, and (2) 
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. Thurman at 
1262. 
A 
The First Prong Voluntariness of the Consent 
After the officer asked the driver if there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in 
the vehicle, the driver said there were not any. The officer then asked for consent to 
search. Mr. Ziegleman unhesitantly replied "help yourself." (See findings of Judge Ballif, 
No 6.) 
The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and found nothing of substance. 
The officer then asked for consent to search the trunk, which consent was again given by 
the driver. Again no contraband was found. Officer Bushnell then searched the hood area 
where the cocaine was discovered. (See findings of Judge Ballif, No 6) This court 
emphasizes that consent was sought and granted in two instances as the level of intrusion and 
search increased. The response in each instance was affirmative. 
The State argues that the first prong is met because the defendant "never alleged 
that his consent was not given voluntarily.* State's Memorandum at 10. However, "(t)he 
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary." 
Thurman at 1263 (citations omitted). The only proof offered by the State is that "Trooper 
BushnelTs uncontroverted testimony was that defendant in fact consented to the search." 
State's Memorandum at 11 (citing Sepulveda1). 
Despite the State's assertion that "(t)he first prong... is not at issue," I$L* "whether 
the requisite voluntariness exists depends on the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-
both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." Thurman at 1262-
63 (citations omitted). Whether the defendant's consent was actually a product of his or her 
free will is a factual question. "The analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same 
without regard to whether the consent was obtained after illegal police conduct." I& at 
1262. In the case at hand, this issue is not as clear cut as the state asserts. 
The burden never shifts to the defendant to show that the consent was involuntary. 
The burden always rests with the state to show that the consent was voluntary. The state 
argues that the defendant has never alleged that his consent was involuntary. But Thurman 
holds that the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the consent was given voluntarily. 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993). Given the state's burden of proof on 
this issue, it may be inappropriate for the state to require the defendant to allege involuntary 
consent; rather whether the consent was given voluntarily must be part of the state's 
affirmative burden of proof. 
This court, after consideration of the totality of the circumstances, concludes that 
the consent to search was freely and unequivocally given. The court relies upon the 
following in reaching that conclusion: 
1. Officer Lance Bushnell was the only witness called by the State and his 
testimony was undisputed; 
2. Defendant did not choose to attend the supplemental hearing to dispute the 
officer's version; 
Sfll 
3. The initial consent was given unhesitatingly; the defendant did not delay in his 
response nor did he equivocate; 
4. This court considers a "help yourself" response to Officer BushnelTs inquiry to 
be unequivocal,absent any testimony to the contrary; 
5. There is no testimony that the defendant revoked or attempted to revoke his 
consent at any stage. 
6. The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendant reconfirmed his consent as the 
search proceed beyond the initial interior search. Officer Bushnell asked the 
defendant if he could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and the defendant 
said "go ahead." 
B. 
The Second Prong Whether the Consent 
was Obtained by Police Exploitation of the Prior Illegality 
It is uncontested that Officer Bushnell, after making the stop, asked to search the 
vehicle. It is the defendants position that the consent obtained is vitiated because the 
detention unlawfully continued after any lawful and proper purpose had passed. 
The state's interpretation of the second prong as set forth in Thurman is correct. 
Thurman does seem to base the need for suppression of evidence obtained from consent 
following illegal police action on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Three 
factors are to be considered to determine whether or not to permit the introduction of the 
evidence resulting from consent after a police illegality—(1) "the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct," (2) the "temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent," and (3) 
"the presence of intervening circumstances. "Id. at 1263. 
The state claims that the Thurman court analysis of the first "purpose and 
flagrance" factor is controlling in the present case. The court analyzes this factor as follows: 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. Thus, if the police had no "purpose" in engaging in 
the misconduct-for example, if the illegality arose because we later invalidated a 
statute on which the police had relied in good faith-suppression would have no 
a% 
deterrent value 
M, at 1263-64 (citations omitted). If this is the case, then the court seems to indicate that 
further analysis is not required. The state claims that the present case is akin to this 
scenario. 
This case does not involve good faith reliance upon a statute which was later 
invalidated. There were, at best, conflicting cases in the Tenth Circuit and no Utah court 
ruling on the issue of whether the officer's questions was in violation of the defendant's 
rights. The instant case, though distinguishable on the facts, is sufficiently akin to 
"statute/revocation" scenario to merit the same analysis and the same result. While it may 
be a close call, it appears to this court that the state's emphasis on the "purpose and 
flagrancy" factor is accurate because of the facts brought out at the supplementary hearing. 
The state has de-emphasized the other important factors of temporaral proximity and the 
presence of intervening circumstances. But the state argues that because uiere was no clear 
court pronouncements regarding these types of questions asked by the arresting officer, his 
improper questioning was only a "technical" violation. This argument, thought fairly 
complex, appears to be sound in light of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v. 
Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, (1975). 
This court agrees with the state's position that Officer Bushnell could have 
detained defendant to further investigate defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration 
form or evidence of his entitlement to use the vehicle. Cf. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (once 
a driver has produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning). 
Consequently, under Walker Bushnell's conduct was arguably permissible because it did not 
delay the stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the issue of whether defendant had 
permissive use of the vehicle. 
Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here, the Court of Appeals has 
similarly recognized that the "running of a warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is 
permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the stop. "Steve v. Figueroa-
Solorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992). 
Two contemporaneous decisions from the California courts reflect a split similar to 
that evidenced in the decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Compare People 
v.Lusardi. 228 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 280 Cal. Rpter. 80, 81 (Cal. Super. 1991) ("Officers 
making a proper traffic (stop) cannot, on mere hunch, properly ask for consent to search (;) 
the consent obtained is vitiated because the detention unlawfully continued after any lawful 
and proper purpose has passed"); with People v. Galindo. 229 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1529, 
218 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (Cal. App. 1991) (Officer's post-citation inquiry of defendant -
which included whether there were any guns or drugs in the car and request for permission 
to search car—was proper). 
This court further agrees with the state's position, under the facts of this case, that 
Officer Bushnell could have detained defendant's vehicle based on defendant's failure to 
produce proper vehicle registration. He also could have continued to investigate his 
suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. Utah had yet to address the issue of whether it was 
permissible for an officer, in the course of a routine traffic stop, to ask the question posed by 
Bushnell. In light of the conflicting opinions from other courts on the issue presented, it 
cannot be said that the trooper's asking defendant whether there were any weapons or 
narcotics in the vehicle constituted flagrant misconduct or even a negligent violation of the 
law. Moreover, the encounter was not merely a routine traffic stop, but instead involved 
defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration form and to demonstrate permissive use 
of the vehicle beyond asserting that a friend identified only as •Bill1' had loaned him the car. 
Since this case is akin to one in which "the illegality arose because (a court) later 
invalidated a statue on which the police had relied in good faith (;) suppression would 
(therefore) have no deterrent value." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264 (citation omitted). 
Consequently, the absence of a temporal break or other intervening circumstance between the 
asking of the improper question and defendant's consent to search in inconsequential. Sfi£ 
generally. Brown. 422 U.S. at 611-12. 
This court fully recognizes that its principal focus on the "purpose and flagrancy of 
the official misconduct" may result in an additional remand to further examine the "temporal 
proximity of the illegality and the consent" factor as well as "the presence of intervening 
circumstance" factor. Nonetheless, this court has principally focused on "the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct" factor because of the unique facts established at the 
supplemental evidentiary hearing. Consider: 
1. At the time of the stop, July 20, 1991, there was no written or verbal policy of 
the Utah Highway Patrol, or the officer's department, proscribing an inquiry of a 
driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in the 
vehicle. 
2. Departmental policy allowed Officer Bushnell to ask personal questions at the 
time of a traffic stop; the questions were not scripted. 
3. The questions posed to the driver of this vehicle were those routinely asked in 
his law enforcement practice. This driver was not singled out for any reason. 
4. Officer Bushnell adjusts his law enforcement practices based up training, advice 
from the county attorney, based upon Utah Highway Patrol directives and based 
upon court decisions. 
5. He was not aware through these educational and training efforts as of July 20, 
1991, that any law, statute, court case prohibited or called into question his inquiry 
regarding contraband in a vehicle or a request to search. As of July 20, 1991, he 
acted in conformity with his training and legal advice. 
6. Lastly, and most importantly, it is stressed that Officer Bushnell has abandoned 
this procedure in light of court decisions handed down since July 20, 1991. State v. Godina-
Luna 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). No one would suggest that law enforcement officers 
should be clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate decisions. 
It is clear that the suppression of the evidence in this case would, therefore, have 
absolutely no deterent effect whatsoever because this officer's routine has long since 
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comported with new caselaw which gave him guidance. This court concludes that since there 
were no clear court pronouncements as of July 20, 1991, regarding these type of questions 
asked by this officer, his improper questioning was only a •technical" violation. A technical 
violation does not necessarily require suppression of the seized cocaine, because it is clear 
that here would be no deterrent effect. Officer Bushnell long ago abandoned these inquiries 
when the position was clarified. His practice has been consistent with law. The deterrence 
rationale discussed in Arroyo is mooted by his volunteer abandonment of the challenged 
inquiry. No deterrent purpose in implicated or served in this case by suppressing the 
cocaine. 
This court characterizes the nature and degree of the prior illegality as technical and 
not flagrant or egregious. It does not rise to the level of willful or even negligent 
misconduct even though Officer Bushnell exceeded the permissible scope of detention. 
Decision 
Based upon the above facts and discussion, Officer Bushnell could have properly 
detained the defendant to verify his entitlement to utilize the vehicle even though he exceeded 
the scope of detention when he asked Mr. Ziegleman whether there were any weapons or 
narcotics in the vehicle. As of July 20, 1991, that inquiry was not proscribed by Utah 
caselaw, by statute, or by departmental policy and was, therefore, arguably proper under the 
law as of that date. 
Under the reasoning of Arroyo, as recently "clarified" by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Thurman. defendants volunteer and unequivocable consent to search was not obtained by 
law enforcement exploitation of a prior illegality. In light of the discussion above, there 
would be absolutely no deterrent effect accomplished by suppressing the cocaine seized from 
the vehicle. 
Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied and the clerk of the court is 
instructed to set this case for jury trial forthwith. 
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For the reasons stated in the Court's May 27, 1994 
"Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress," defendant's motion to 
suppress should be and hereby is DENIED. 
Dated this day of July, 1994. 
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This matter came before the Court on defendants' motions 
to suppress cocaine, which was found in the hood of a car 
defendants were driving. Defendant Michael John McNaughton filed 
his motion on August 26, 1991 and defendant Brent Ziegleman filed 
his motion on September 6, 1991. 
The Court, having proceeded with an evidentiary hearing and 
also having considered the motions and memoranda, now enters its: 
RULING. 
The Court denies defendants' motions in that the officer 
was justified in making the initial stop of the vehicle, he had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to detain defendants, 
and he obtained a valid consent to search to vehicle. In the event 
that either the initial stop or subsequent detention are flawed, 
then under a fourth amendment search and seizure analysis the issue 
of standing and of a reasonable expectation of privacy would arise. 
However, in this case defendants have not established that they had 
such an expectation, especially in .the hood area of the vehicle. 
1. 
2. 
POINT ONE—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE INITIAL STOP 
The Utah courts have held that a police officer may stop 
an automobile for a traffic violation committed in his presence, 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), and that an officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a 
citation. State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). In 
this case the officer, who was certified at estimating the speed of 
vehicles, believed that there had been a speeding violation. He 
testified that he attempted to warn defendants of this, but because 
they would not look at him, he pulled them over to relay this 
warning. 
It should be noted that if defendants' lack of eye contact was 
the cause of the initial stop for speeding, it was only due to the 
fact that the officer had been unable to warn defendant Ziegleman 
about his excessive speed by giving hand signals. This behavior 
did not, in and of itself, lead the officer to believe that there 
was more serious criminal activity going on. Although the officer 
considers nervousness and shifty eye movements as evidencing guilt 
in certain circumstances, those behaviorisms in the later part of 
this investigation only served to reinforce other findings as the 
investigation continued. 
POINT TWO—THE OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING DEFENDANTS 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL STOP 
In Robinson, the Utah Appellate Court held that once an 
officer has obtained a valid driver's license and evidence of 
3. 
entitlement to use the vehicle, the driver must be allowed to 
proceed on his way. Here the driver, Brent Ziegleman, could not 
produce a registration for the vehicle, and the only entitlement 
to use the car was his claim that his friend "Bill" had loaned him 
the car. He could provide no further information about "Bill." 
In State v, Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) it was stated 
that an officer may seize or detain a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion11 that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime. Here, the officer has testified that he 
suspected that the car had been stolen. Therefore, he detained the 
defendants in order that he could check with NCIC to see if the 
car had been stolen. 
POINT THREE—THE OFFICER OBTAINED A VALID CONSENT TO SEARCH THE 
VEHICLE 
It is unclear from the facts whether the officer asked for 
consent to search the car while he was waiting for the results from 
NCIC, or whether he had already learned the car was not listed as 
stolen when he asked for consent. In any event, it is undisputed 
that Ziegleman replied, unhesitatingly, "help yourself.11 This 
seems to be voluntary consent and, in fact defendants have not 
alleged any police coercion or duress, but claim the search is 
invalid under a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. However, 
the initial stop was valid, t£e subsequent detention was valid, 
and the contraband was discovered under the hood of the car 
pursuant to a valid consent to a search, and thus it is admissible. 
96 
4. 
POINT FOUR—DEFENDANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT TO A SEARCH OF 
THE HOOD AREA 
The foregoing analysis assumes that defendants had standing to 
object to the search, pursuant to a fourth amendment search and 
seizure analysis. However, in the event that the initial stop, the 
subsequent detention or the search were flawed in some manner, the 
issue does arise whether defendants had standing, or had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hood area, to begin with. 
According to Utah case law, the legitimate expectation of 
privacy test is a fact sensitive and not a bright line test. State 
v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989). In State v. Taylor, 169 
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah App. September 12, 1991) , it was held that 
a defendant can have a legitimate expectation of privacy if he is 
the owner or is in possession of the property with the permission 
of the owner, and that "in order to be sufficient for fourth 
amendment purposes, a subjective expectation of privacy must be one 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 
In this case, defendants admitted they were not the owners of 
the vehicle, could produce no registration for it, and could not 
produce evidence that permission had been given to them by the true 
owner to use the car. All they could say is that "Bill", about 
whom they could give no details, had loaned them the car. The only 
circumstance implying permissive use of the car was that they were 
in possession of the car. This is not sufficient to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Furthermore, even if defendants had such an expectation in the 
?/ 
5. 
passenger compartment of the vehicle, they most likely did not have 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the area under the hood of 
the vehicle. Pursuant to Taylor, this is certainly not an 
expectation that society would recognize as reasonable, when they 
were not the owners of the vehicle and have not established that 
they had the permission of the true owner to use the vehicle. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 1*4 day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
#? 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
Criminal No. 82-E 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and : 
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON, 
Defendants. : 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing 
upon the defendants Motion to Suppress on November 15, 1991. The 
defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and represented by his 
attorney, W. Andrew McCullough, and the defendant, Michael 
HcNaughton, was present and represented by his attorney, Milton T. 
Harmon. The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., 
Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the 
State of Utah and the defendants and having reviewed the Memorandum 
of Law submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises and the Court having previously entered its Ruling dated 
1 
C.*>* c! Dfctrtci Court, Jueb toutnhi 
F I L £ D 7 
ral P. G"een*'ooo\C!erk ^ ^ . D c p i t " 
January 14, 1992, now makes the following: 
flNPJNGS OF FACT 
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper 
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, 
observed a motor vehicle in the area of Nephi, and visually 
estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75 
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle. 
The officer had received training and certification in estimating 
of speeds. 
2. The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a 
paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60 
m.p.h.. He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of 
giving the driver a hand signal to slow down. Neither the driver 
nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them 
to slow down. The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent 
of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding. 
3. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee 
Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant, 
Michael McNaughton. 
4. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the 
driver and asked for a driver's license and registration. The 
driver produced a driver's license, but was unable to produce a 
registration. The driver claimed the ownerfs name was ,fBilltf and 
2 
he was a friend and he had borrowed the car, but could give no 
further information concerning his name or where he lived. While 
the driver searched for the registration, he appeared to be 
extremely nervous with the hands trembling. The occupants had no 
written authorization or anything that gave them the right to be 
in possession of the vehicle. 
5. The officer ran the vehicle through the NCIC computer to 
determine if it was reported stolen. The request came back 
negative, but the officer continued to investigate the possibility 
of a stolen vehicle, because of his past experience of finding 
stolen vehicles not listed on NCIC as stolen. 
6. The officer then asked the driver if there were any 
weapons, drugs or narcotics in the vehicle. The driver said there 
was not any. The officer then asked for consent to search, Mr. 
Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself". 
7. The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and 
found nothing of substance. The officer then asked for consent to 
search the trunk, which consent was again given by the driver. 
Again no contraband was found therein. The officer then search the 
hood area. Between the right front fender and the battery was an 
oil cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine 
contained therein. 
8. Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine 
3 
?r 
with the intent to distribute. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. The stop of the defendants' vehicle by Trooper Bushnell 
for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. 
2. The continued detention of the defendants after the 
initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants 
inability to produce a registration for the vehicle or any 
authority to be in possession of the vehicle. 
3. The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily consented to a 
search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress 
by the officer. 
4. Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have 
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle. 
5. Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied. 
Dated this 1 ^> day of c^p^c^^^^h: >**& 
2& district Judge 
/ 
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Donald J. Eyre Jr.f No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1 
VS. : MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN and : Criminal No. 82-E 
MICHAEL McNAUGHTON, 
Defendants. : 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court upon 
both defendants1 Motions to Suppress for hearing on November 15, 
1991 before the Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge 
thereof. The defendant, Brent Ziegleman, was present and 
represented by bis attorney, W. Andrew McCullough, and the 
defendant, Michael McNaughton, was present and represented by his 
attorney, Milton T. Harmon. The State of Utah was represented by 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having previously entered its Ruling dated January 
14, 1992, and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants1 
1 
/00 
F I L E D 
Fai P. G"6eri>vood,C!ifk . ^ - . U p . i y 
Motions to Suppress are denied. 





Court of Appeals' Decision In 
Defendant's 1993 Interlocutory Appeal 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
>^^/&^^ •- I/Hi,' . ^ _ _ 
p/- Mary T. Noonan 
<si-»*e of Jtah MEMORANDUM DECIsffeft0^00"* 
(Not For Publication) 
! I "i" 1 : i ff and Appellee, 
Case No. 920344-CA v. 
Brent Ziegleman, 
Defendant and Appellai 1 t. 
(September 
Fourth District, Juab county 
The Honorable George E. Ballif 
w# Andrew McCullough, Orem, for Appellants 
Jan Graham and Todd A. Utzinger, Salt Lake 
Appellee 
I'LM ir> I'mi'j*- I i "n eenwood, and Russon. 
tidge ° 
j way of an it i n t e r l o e u t o r y a p p e a l , defendant challeiiijii h Mi i," 
court's denia] of his motion to suppress evidence. 
The trial coi ir t held that (1) defendant was legally stopp 
for speeding; (2) continued detention after the stop was 
justified; and (3) defendant voluntarily consented to a search 
the vehicle. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that (4) 
defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle, 
On appeal, defendant challenges all four of these rulings. 
1 „ The Stop 
The trial cour t found the stop was la wful based on the 
officer's reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. The 
officer testified that he stopped defendant to issue him a 
warning citation, after having visually estimated the speed of 
defendant's vehicle to be 75 m.p.h. Since there is evidence to 
support the trial court's finding, \ #e I iphold the validity of the 
stop 
2. Continued Detention 
After having verified that the vehicle had not been reported 
stolen, the officer asked defendant whether there were any 
weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. On appeal, the State 
concedes that this question exceeded the scope of detention for a 
routine traffic stop and that the question was unrelated to the 
issue of whether the vehicle was stolen. The State therefore 
concedes "that the continued detention of defendant violated the 
fourth amendment." Because of this concession, we reverse the 
trial court's determination that continued detention was 
justified. 
3. Consent 
In view of the State's concession that the consent was 
obtained only after an illegal police activity, the court's 
finding of consent is now incomplete. The trial court, on 
remand, must address "^whether the consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality' . . . or, in other words, 
*whether the %taint' of the Fourth Amendment violation was 
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.'" 
See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
4. Standing 
The State also concedes that defendant has standing to 
challenge the search of the vehicle. Because of this concession, 




I. •„ i. the State's concessions, the decision ui I he 
trial cc *s reversed and the case is remanded for a 
determination as to whether the consent to search was witlnl under 
Thurman. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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